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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
SPITE FENCE STATUTE
A landowner maliciously erects a fence on his own property
which obstructs the light and air of the adjoining landowner
thereby effectively annoying the adjoining landowner. In such a
situation is the adjoining landowner entitled to any legal or equit-
able relief? The leading Pennsylvania case on the question of the
legality of spite fences is Cohen v. Perrino.' The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held in Cohen that a spite fence was legal and no re-
lief, therefore, was available to the complaining party.
2
Although never mentioned in Cohen, there is a Pennsylvania
statute passed long before the decision in Cohen3 which prohibits
spite fences:
It shall be unlawful for the owner or occupant of any
improved premises, in any suburban district of a city or
borough (whether the premises concerned be assessed at
rural, suburban, or city rates), to erect any fence, or struc-
ture resembling a fence, or to re-erect during the process
of repairing, any fence previously erected, upon any part of
the front yard, lawn, or space of said premises, or on or
along the boundary line thereof, of a greater height than
four feet, if the height in excess of said four feet is un-
necessary, or if the same is maliciously erected, elevated,
and maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or
occupant of the adjoining premises. Every such fence or
structure, so maliciously erected, elevated, and main-
tained in excess of four feet in height, shall be deemed, and
is hereby declared to be a private nuisance.4
1. 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 169 (1947).
2. Id. at 461, 50 A.2d at 351.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957) (Act of May 26, 1939, No. 134
§ 1, [1939] Pa. Laws 231, formerly Act of June 22, 1917, No. 214, § 1, [1917]
Pa. Laws 623). The criminal aspect of the spite fence statute, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 15172 (Act of June 22, 1917, No. 214, § 2, [1917] Pa. Laws
623), provides:
Any person or persons erecting and maintaining the fence or struc-
ture, described in section one hereof' as unlawful and prohibited,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, if convicted thereof,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more
than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail
for not less than thirty days or not more than six months, or by
both fine and imprisonment to said respective amount and extent,
at the discretion of the trial judge.
'Section 15171 of this title. This section of the statute was declared uncon-
stitutional in the lower court case of Commonwealth v. Szaluga, 60 Pa.
D. & C. 402, 403 (C.P. Allegheny 1947). See notes 66-69 infra and ac-
companying text.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
Thus the statutory and case law dealing with the legality of
spite fences in Pennsylvania are in direct conflict. This Comment
will review the law on spite fences in the absence of statute, and
will compare and analyze Pennsylvania's statute with those of other
states. The legal rights of both the erecting landowner and the ad-
joining landowner will be discussed and a conclusion offered in light
of the conflicting statutory and case law on the legality of spite
fences in Pennsylvania.
I. SPITE FENCES IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
The problem of the legality of spite fences is another example
of the attempt by the courts to balance the rights of adjoining
landowners.5 Although numerous cases have discussed the legality
of spite fences, a reading of these cases indicates that the arguments
presented on either side have not changed over the years.6
A. Spite Fences are Legal
A case often cited for the position that all spite fences are legal
is Letts v. Kessler.7 The defendant maliciously erected a fence of
no benefit to himself. The court treated the question in terms of
property rights.5
The court's reasoning in Letts was a two step process. The first
step was to determine if the plaintiff could properly complain of the
injury.9 Is the deprivation of light and air an injury for which a
landowner may seek relief? It was the court's decision in Letts
that it was not proper to complain of the deprivation of light and air
since the plaintiff had no property right in light and air.10 The idea
that the deprivation of light and air does not constitute an infringe-
ment on one's property rights is often cited as a reason for allowing
spite fences.'1 This implies that the right to receive light and air is
5. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947):
The law of nuisance plys between two antithetical extremes:
The principle that every person is entitled to use his property for
any purpose that he sees fit, and the opposing principle that every-
one is bound to use his property in such a manner as not to in-
jure the property or rights of his neighbor. For generations courts
in their tasks of judging, have ruled on these extremes according to
the wisdom of the day, and many have recognized that the con-
temporary view of the public policy shifts from generation to gen-
eration.
Id. at 476, 78 N.E.2d at 759.
6. See Scharlack v. Gulf Oil Corp., 368 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Harrison v. Laughlinais, 312 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Con-
tra Welsh v. Todd, 260 N.C. 527, 133 S.E.2d 171 (1963); Erickson v. Hudson,
41 Wyo. 570, 249 P.2d 523 (1952).
7. 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N.E. 765 (1896).
8. Id. at 80, 42 N.E. at 766.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N.E. 548 (1904); Bordeaux v. Green,
22 Mont. 254, 56 P. 218 (1889); Levy v. Samuel, 4 Misc. 48, 23 N.Y.S. 825
(Super. 1893); Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W. Va. 37, 53 S.E. 793 (1906). In
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subject to your neighbor's discretionary right to build a structure
which interferes with your light and air. An interesting explana-
tion for this rule is presented in Hornsby v. Smith.12 If one could
claim a legal right to light and air, he could effectively stifle further
development of an area. Such a legal right would bar his neighbors
from building next to him if the effect of the structure would be to
cut off his light and air. Thus, to encourage development, the rule
denying property rights in light and air was adopted.
13
Although it would seem that the court's holding in Letts that
the plaintiff had no property right in light and air was sufficient in
itself to bar the plaintiff's complaint, the court offered a second ar-
gument. The plaintiff argued for the following rule: If the de-
fendant's motive be malicious yet the structure be useful or of some
profit to himself then the courts should not inquire into his motive.
But if the structure serves no useful or ornamental purpose, such
an act should not be permitted. 14 The court refused the plaintiff's
proposed rule stating:
To permit a man to cause a certain injurious effect upon the
premises of his neighbor by the erection of a structure on
his own premises if such structure is beneficial or ornamen-
tal, and to prohibit him from causing the same effect in
case the structure is neither beneficial nor ornamental, but
erected from motives of pure malice, is not protecting a
legal right, but is controlling his moral conduct. In this
state a man is free to direct his moral conduct as he pleases,
in so far as he is not restrained by statute.15
The argument that a legal act will not be made illegal due to
the actor's motive is repeated in many cases which hold a spite fence
to be illegal.'6 The legal act is, of course, the erection of a fence
Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that no easement to light and air can be obtained by prescrip-
tion, thus implying that light and air are not property rights. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court also stated that the right to receive light and air
can be obtained by grant and in such a case the spite fence would be
illegal. Id. at 457, 50 A.2d at 349.
12. 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941).
13. Id. at 496, 13 S.E.2d at 23.
14. Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 81, 42 N.E. 765, 766 (1896).
15. Id.
16. In Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947), the court
placed heavy emphasis on the idea that one's motive is irrelevant where
the act is legal and gave the following examples from past Pennsylvania
cases:
When a creditor who has a just debt brings a suit or issues execu-
tion, though he does so out of pure emnity to the debtor, he is safe.
In slander, if the defendant proves the words spoken to be true,
his intention to injure the plaintiff by proclaiming his infamy,
will not defeat the justification. One who prosecutes another for a
crime, need not show in an action for malicious prosecution that
which cuts off one's neighbor's light and air. Often a court will
rely on the legality of spite fences at common law to support their
legality today.17
B. Spite Fences are Illegal
The arguments offered against spite fences have also not
changed drastically with time.'8 Often the courts which condemn
spite fences seem to be proceeding on a wholly moral basis.19 A
careful reading of these cases, however, indicates that the argu-
ments against spite fences are not limited to moral ones. Perhaps
the best expression of the idea that there is a legal right to light and
air is found in Hornsby v. Smith.20 In Hornsby the court held:
The right of the plaintiff in this case to the free passage of
light and air is subject only to a superior right of defen-
dant to make use of her property in good faith for the pur-
pose of increasing her joy of ownership .... 21
This statement is not violative of the policy considerations
which underlie the principle that a landowner may not acquire an
easement to light and air.22 An area could not develop if the first
house built would give the owner a right to light and air which
could effectively bar the erection of houses. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the development of an area is not restrained where the
owner is not permitted to build a fence which serves absolutely no
purpose other than to annoy his neighbor.
In essence, the reasoning is as follows: The complaining party
has a legal right to light and air subject to the adjoining property
owner's superior right to make use of his property in good faith.
The exercise of this right will extinguish the complaining party's
right to light and air. But the erection of a spite fence is not consid-
ered an exercise of this superior right, and consequently, the com-
plaining party has a legal right which has been violated.
23
he was actuated by correct feelings, if he can prove that there was
good reason to believe the charge was well founded.
Id. at 460, 50 A.2d at 350.
17. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523 (1896); Rideout v.
Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372, 19 N.E. 390, 391 (1889). The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947), did not
expressly state its interpretation of the common law position with regard to
the right to build a fence which cuts off light and air.
18. See cases cited note 6 supra.
19. In Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888), the court
stated: "What right has the defendant, in the light of just and beneficient
principles of equity, to shut out God's free air and sunlight from the win-
dows of his neighbor. . . ." Id. at 389, 37 N.W. at 842. See also Norton v.
Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912), where the court stated: "[T]he
ancient maxim of the common law, 'Sic utere tuo, alienum non laedas,' is
not founded in any human statute, but in the sentiment expressed by Him
who taught good will toward men, and said, 'Love thy neighbor as thy
self.'" Id. at 386, 58 So. at 286.
20. 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941).
21. Id. at 496, 13 S.E.2d at 25.
22. See cases cited note 11 supra.
23. Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 498, 13 S.E.2d 20, 25 (1941); Burke
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Often the courts which hold spite fences to be illegal take issue
with the idea 24 that motive will not make an otherwise legal act il-
legal. In Burke v. Smith25 the court pointed out that where a
spring runs under both A and B's land, A has a legal right to sink a
well and drain off the water. But, if A's purpose is purely mali-
cious, he does not drain off the water for his own benefit but
merely to harm B, then the act will be illegal.2 6 It is submitted,
however, that if a court finds a spite fence to be illegal then such a
discussion is academic.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
WITH THOSE OF OTHER STATES
Pennsylvania is one of fourteen states which have enacted a
statute forbidding spite fences. 27 For purposes of comparison, the
Pennsylvania statute is broken into five component parts: (1) the
type of structure prohibited, (2) the location of the fence, (3) the
height of the fence, (4) the mental element required and, (5) the
remedy provided.
28
The Pennsylvania statute applies to "any fence or structure re-
sembling a fence. ' '29 This language is typical of nine30 of the other
statutes in that it is limited in its application to fences. Several
statutes are far broader than the Pennsylvania statute in that they
are not aimed merely at spite fences but include spite structures. 1
v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 394, 37 N.W. 838, 840 (1888); Barger v. Barringer,
151 N.C. 433, 437, 66 S.E. 439, 442 (1909).
24. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
25. 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888).
26. Id. at 386, 37 N.W. at 841.
27. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 841.4 (West 1954); CONN. REV. STAT. §§ 52-480,
52-570 (1958); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 30-401, 30-402 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 433.860 (1970); ME. RE~v. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.3 (1968); N.Y. REAL. PROP. AcTIONS § 843 (McKinney
1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 15171, 15172 (1957); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 34-10-20 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3817 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.40.030 (1961); WIs. STAT. § 280.08 (Supp. 1969).
28. See text of statute accompanying note 4 supra. A discussion of
the restriction of the Pennsylvania spite fence statute to suburban dis-
tricts is presented in Section IV B of this Comment infra.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 841.4 (West 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 30-401,
30-402 (1969); Ky. REV. STAT. § 433.860 (1970); Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2801 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.3 (1968); N.Y. REAL. PROP. AcTIoNs § 843 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-10-20 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 280.08
(Supp. 1969).
31. CONN. REV. STAT. §§ 52-480, 52-570 (1958); MTNN. STAT. § 561.02
(1947); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3817 (1967); WASH. REV. Code § 7.40.030
(1969).
Except for the Pennsylvania statute, all those which are limited
to fences are silent as to where the fence must be located in order
to be prohibited. Whereas a question might arise under the other
statutes if the fence was not close to the boundary line,32 the
Pennsylvania statute would seem to apply regardless of the location
of the fence.3 3 The result appears logical. Because a spite fence is
not near the boundary line is not a good reason for allowing it to re-
main if the motive for erecting it, and the effect of the fence, are the
same as with a spite fence near the boundary line.
The Pennsylvania statute applies only to fences higher than
four feet.3 4 Pennsylvania's statue is far from unique in specifying a
definite height. Nine other statutes have a specific height limita-
tion.3 5  The effect of a maximum height limitation is to permit a
landowner to erect a fence up to the statutory limit, regardless of
his motive for doing so, and regardless of the effect of the fence on
his neighbor, or the absence of any benefit to him. Pennsylvania's
height limitation of four feet is the most restrictive of those stat-
utes with a provision for a specific height. California legislators
felt that any fence over ten feet was a sufficient restriction.
3 6 If
the purpose of a spite fence statute is to remedy the harm caused
by spite fences, there seems to be no need to set a statutory height.
For example, what if the plaintiff lived in a basement apartment
and the fence was only four feet high? The effect of the fence
could be the same as one five feet high yet the defendant would be
exempt under the Pennsylvania statute. Setting an arbitrary
height therefore appears inferior to deciding each case on its facts.
The Pennsylvania statute prohibits the erection of a fence
greater than four feet in height if the height above four feet is "un-
necessary". The term "unnecessary," or some variation thereof, also
appears in eight other statutes. 7 The term "unnecessary," as it is
32. "It is at least doubtful whether the [Mass. spite fence statute] ap-
plies to fences and not substantially adjoining the injured party's land."
Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 373, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (1889). The Massa-
chusetts statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968), is silent as to
the location of the fence.
33. "[U]pon any part of the front yard, lawn or space of said premises
or on or along the boundary line thereof ... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
15171 (1957).
34. "[O]f a height greater than four feet ... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53,
§ 15171 (1957).
35. CAL. CirV. CODE § 841.4 (West. 1954) (10 feet); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 30-401, 30-402 (1969) (6 feet); KY. REv. STAT. § 433.860 (1970) (5 feet);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964) (6 feet); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 49, § 21 (1968) (6 feet); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.3 (1968)
(5 feet); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 843 (McKinney 1963) (10 feet); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-10-20 (1969) (6 feet); Wis. STAT. § 280.08 (Supp.
1969) (6 feet).
36. CAL. Civ. CODE § 841.4 (West 1954).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE: § 841.4 (West 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 30-401,
30-402 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964); MASS. GF-N. LAWS
ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.3 (1968);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-10-20 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3817
(1967); Ws. STAT. § 280.08 (Supp. 1969).
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incorporated in the other eight statutes, is part of the mental ele-
ment required by those statutes. 8  The Pennsylvania statute, how-
ever, appears to set "unnecessary" up as a sufficient basis by itself
for relief.8 9 A question exists as to how the Pennsylvania statute
should be interpreted in light of this peculiar use of the term "un-
necessary." It is submitted that the term "unnecessary" should not
be interpreted to mean that if a plaintiff could show that the height
in excess of four feet was unnecessary, with no allegation of the de-
fendant's motive, he would then be entitled to relief. To adopt
such an interpretation would be to ignore the title of the statute,
"Malicious erection of fences in suburban districts of city or bor-
ough; nuisance. '40 The spirit of the statute requires a mental
element as well as requiring that the fence be unnecessary. The
fence must be erected "maliciously" 41 and "for the purpose of an-
noying.14 2 To ignore the mental element is to make the statute a
"fence statute" as opposed to a "spite fence statute". This does
not appear to have been the intent of the legislature.
The term "unnecessary" in the Pennsylvania statute should be
interpreted as part of the mental element required by the statute.
Several statutes are similar to the Pennsylvania statute in terms of
the mental element required.43 The courts which have interpreted
the mental element of spite fence statutes have pointed out that if
the fence is of benefit to the one erecting it, it is not a spite fence.
44
38. The Indiana statute, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 30-401, 30-402 (1969)
which is typical of those which include the term unnecessary, provides:
"[U]nnecessarily exceeds six [6] feet in height, maliciously erected or
maintained for the purpose of annoying. .. ."
39. "[I]f the height in excess of the said four feet is unnecessary or
the same is maliciously erected .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957) (emphasis added). See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1969) which provides: "The title and preamble
of a law may be considered in the construction thereof."
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
42. Id.
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 841.4 (West 1954) provides:
[U]nnecessarily exceeding ten feet in height maliciously erected
or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant
of adjoining premises ...
MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968) provides:
[U]nnecessarily exceeds six feet in height and is maliciously
erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or
occupants of adjoining property....
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964) provides:
[U] nnecessarily exceeding six feet in height, maliciously kept and
maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of
adjoining property....
44. See Wendling v. Kafrat, 232 Ky. 842, 24 S.W.2d 909 (1930); Kark-
sek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 P. 33 (1900); cf. Brostroni v. Lauppe, 179
Mass. 315, 60 N.E. 785 (1901).
Often the courts explain this by stating that for the fence to be a
spite fence, maliciousness must be the dominant motive for erecting
the fence. 45 The term unnecessary then is interpreted as the con-
verse of "benefit to the one erecting the fence"40 Therefore, if the
fence is of benefit to the one erecting it, it is not unnecessary, and
the requisite mental elment for a spite fence is not present. Ap-
plying this interpretation of unnecessary, a landowner would be
permitted to erect a fence to protect his privacy, even though his
motive was in part malicious. 47
The remedy provided by the Pennsylvania spite fence statute
is to be inferred from the fact that a spite fence is declared a private
nuisance. 48 Nine of the other statutes declare a spite fence to be a
private nuisance and describe the appropriate remedy.49  The
Maine statute is silent as to the remedy.50
III. JuDicAL HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SPITE FENCE STATUTE 5 1
The first court to deal with the statute ignored it in its decision.
In Feathers v. Baer,5 2 a suit in equity for abatement of a spite fence,
the plaintiffs were seeking relief on the basis of the Act. 3 The
plaintiffs stated in their pleading that they were residents of a su-
burban district of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, that the fence was
erected for malicious motives, and that it was being maintained for
45. Whitlock v. Uhle, 75 Conn. 423, 53 A. 891 (1903); Rideout v. Knox,
148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1899).
46. See cases cited notes 47, 48 supra.
47. Wendling v. Kafrat, 232 Ky. 842, 24 S.W.2d 909 (1930).
48. "Trespass is a proper form of action to recover damages for the
erection or continuance of a nuisance." 1 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE
ch. 3, § 50 at 494 (rev. ed. 1960). It also appears that the plaintiff in a
spite fence case could seek the equitable remedy of an injunction enjoining
the maintenance of the spite fence. See 8 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE
ch. 36, § 20 (rev. ed. 1960).
49. CAL. CIv. CODE § 841.4 (West 1954); IND. ANN. STAT, §§ 30-401,
30-402 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968); MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (1947); N.H. Ruv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.3 (1968); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 843 (McKinney
(1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-10-20 (1969); WIS. STAT. § 280.08 (Supp.
1969).
50. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 (1964).
51. A review of the proceedings in the legislature leading to the
statute proves rather useless, particularly in determining the legislative in-
tent in limiting the operation of the Act. The Act was first passed in 1917
(Act of June 22, 1917, No. 214, § 1, [1917] Pa. Laws 623) and was amended
in 1939 (Act of May 26, 1939, No. 134, § 1, [1939] Pa. Laws 231). The
amended act is identical to the original except for the following changes:
(1) The Act of 1917 applied only to the cities of the first class while the
amended Act extended coverage to "cities and boroughs". (2) The first
statute spoke of "to erect" while the amended version refers to "erect any
fence or structure resembling a fence, or to re-erect during the process of
repairing any fence previously erected." There is not much which can be
inferred from these additions which is not pure speculation. Also, the
Pennsylvania Legislative Journal sheds no light on the legislature's intent.
52. 52 Pa. D. & C. 305 (C.P. Cambria 1945).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
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the purpose of annoying them. The defendants denied all of the
allegations.5 4 The court chose not to apply the statute. Instead, the
court adopted the Restatement of Torts approach to spite fences55
and granted abatement of the fence."6 With regard to the Pennsyl-
vania statute the court stated:
We have not discussed the effect of the Act of May 26,
1939, P.L. 231, 53 PS § 4231, because we are satisfied that
even in absence of this statute the spite fence in question
is a continuing nuisance. .... 5T
This was a case of first impression in Pennsylvania." The
legislature, however, had already expressed its intent as to the
proper rule and it seems, therefore, that the court took a wide view
of its discretion.
The next spite fence case in Pennsylvania was Cohen v. Per-
rino.59 The court's decision has been discussed previously,60 but its
treatment of the statute is of particular interest. The court ig-
nored the statute. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County suggested in Commonwealth v. Szaluga,61 which dealt with
the criminal aspects of the spite fence statute,62 that the Cohen
court ignored the statute because the premises were in an urban
rather than a suburban district of Philadelphia, 3 and the statute is
54. 52 Pa. D. & C. 305, 306 (C.P. Cambria 1945).
55. The applicable section of the RESTATEMVNT is as follows:
[A]n intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and en-
joyment of land is unreasonable and the actor is liable when the
harm is substantial and his conduct is (a) inspired solely by hos-
tility and a desire to cause harm to the other; or (b) contrary to
common standards of decency.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 829 (1939). The illustration of (a) offered by the
RESTATEMENT authors is as follows:
A and B own adjoining residences. A quarrel between them results
in hard feelings, and A builds a fence 25 feet high along the bound-
ary between his lot and B's lot. A's sole purpose in building the
fence was to annoy B by shutting out the light and view from his
windows. A's conduct is malicious and he is liable to B.
Id. at 257.
56. The court ordered that the fence be lowered to a maximum height
of four feet. Feathers v. Baer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 305, 311 (C.P. Cambria 1945).
57. Id. at 310.
58. It is stated in Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 460, 50 A.2d 348, 350,
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never decided the question of
spite fences. The Cohen case was in 1947 so the court in Feathers would
also be dealing with a case of first impression.
59. 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947).
60. See notes 11, 19, 20 and accompanying text supra.
61. 60 Pa. D. & C. 402 (C.P. Allegheny 1947) (discussed in notes 66-69
and accompanying text supra).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15172 (1957), quoted in note 3 supra.
63. Commonwealth v. Szaluga, 60 Pa. D. & C. 402, 405 (C.P. Allegheny
1947).
limited in application to "suburban districts."' "4 The only sugges-
tion in the Cohen decision that the court was aware of the Pennsyl-
vania spite fence statute is their statement: "Nor is it necessary to
consider cases dealing with the statutory regulations of the use of
land or dealing with nuisance actual or theatened. ' '6 5
The language of the decision would never suggest to a reader
that a statute existed in Pennsylvania dealing with spite fences. It
is submitted that to assume the court's silence as to the Pennsyl-
vania spite fence statute constitutes approval of the statute is to read
too much into the decision. The same is true of assuming that the
court's silence, coupled with its broad sweeping language, consti-
tutes disapproval of the statute. Perhaps the only safe observa-
tion is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never ruled on
the validity of the Pennsylvania spite fence statute.
The Pennsylvania spite fence statute finally gained the atten-
tion of a lower court in Commonwealth v. Szaluga.6 6 The Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County declared Section 2 of the Act,6 7
the criminal aspect of the statute, to be unconstitutional 8 The
court indicated however that the non-criminal aspects of the statute
were still constitutional:
We are not in this opinion undertaking to say that a
person maliciously annoyed by the erection of a spite fence
in a suburban district of a city or borough would not have
an action in equity for abatement of the nuisance, or at
law for damages resulting from the commission of an un-
lawful act in the nature of a private nuisance. 9
The decision in Szaluga was the last judicial treatment of the
Pennsylvania spite fence statute. It should be emphasized that this
decision was limited to the criminal aspects of the statute. Thus, it
appears there has been no judicial decision on the civil or equitable
aspects of the statute.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE
A. Arguments Against Any Spite Fence Statute
Although no case has been discovered in which a court has in-
validated a spite fence statute, several objections to the statutes
64. See text of statute accompanying note 3 supra, and discussion of
this limitation in Section IV B of this Comment infra.
65. 355 Pa. at 461, 50 A.2d at 351.
66. 60 Pa. D. & C. 402 (C.P. Allegheny 1947) (this case was decided
after the decision in Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947) ).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15172 (1957) (see note 3 supra).
68. The court in Commonwealth v. Szaluga, 60 Pa. D. & C. 402 (C.P.
Allegheny 1947), stated that it was not within the power of the legislature
to make a private nuisance an indictable crime. Id. at 403. The court also
indicated that the statute was too vague and uncertain for the imposition
of a criminal sanction. Id. at 406. The court further suggested that the
statute was special legislation. Id. at 406.
69. Id. at 407.
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have been raised. These objections involve two interrelated ques-
tions: First, is the conduct involved a proper subject of the police
power? Second, even if the answer to the first inquiry is in the af-
firmative, does a spite fence statute operate as a taking of property
such that the property owner is entitled to compensation?
1. Proper subject of police power?
An exact definition of the police power is an elusive goal. The
test generally adopted is whether the statute in question tends to
promote the general welfare. 70 Those courts which have dealt
with the question of the constitutionality of spite fence statutes
have held that it is in the public interest to set rules which will pro-
hibit the annoyance of one man by another where such acts would
tend to disrupt the peace of the neighborhood.71
Although the United States Supreme Court has never faced the
question of the constitutionality of a spite fence statute, Camfield
v. United States72 stands in support of the proposition that the
building of spite fences is a proper subject for the police power. In
Camfield the defendants had erected fences which effectively
blocked off public land to all but the defendants. The defendants
had no claim to this public land. The defendants claimed that the
fences were erected on private land, and therefore could not be the
subject of control by statute.7 3 The United States Supreme Court
responded to this contention by citing favorably Rideout v. Knox.7 4
Rideout held that the Massachusetts spite fence statute75 was con-
stitutional:
[A] lthough the use of property is not directly injurious to
the public at large, there is a public interest to restrain
70. 7 P.L.E. Const. Law § 3 (1958):
Based on the principle that a sovereign has a paramount right
and an inescapable duty to maintain law and order to protect life,
liberty, and property, the basis of every exercise of the police
power must be to promote or maintain the health, safety, or gen-
eral welfare of the public, and since the legitimate exercise of the
police power depends on reasonable relation between the thing
acted on and the end to be attained as a promotion of health,
safety or general welfare, a given exercise of the police power
which does not promote or tend to promote the general public
welfare is without constitutional sanction.
Id. at 188.
71. See, e.g., Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889) (dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 74-78 infra).
72. 167 U.S. 518 (1896).
73. Id. at 522. The statute, in this case, dealt with the unlawful
occupancy of public lands. The government argued successfully that this
statute should apply to the defendant's fences.
74. 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889).
75. MAss. Gmi. LAws ANn. ch. 49, § 21 (1968).
this kind of aggressive annoyance of one's neighbor by an-
other, and mark a definite limit beyond which it is not law-
ful to go.76
It was pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Cam-
field77 that Rideout "is authority for the proposition that police
power is not subject to any definite limitations but is co-extensive
with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public in-
terest. 78 The explanation offered in Rideout for applying the po-
lice power to spite fences has been accepted by those courts which
have decided the constitutionality of spite fence statutes.7 9
2. Does the prohibition of spite fences constitute a taking of
property without due compensation?
An exercise of the police power by the state, unlike the power of
eminent domain, does not require compensation to be made to the
complaining party. It is evident that often an exercise of the po-
lice power will involve property rights. If a property owner is de-
nied the right to build a spite fence, is this curtailment of his rights
justified without compensation?
Several cases in which a spite fence statute was involved have
held that the question is inapplicable because the right to build a
spite fence is not a property right.8 0 It is submitted that such a de-
cision indicates the court would have held that a spite fence was
illegal even in the absence of statute. A review of the Cohens '
case, however, indicates that the Pennsylvania court felt that the
right to build a spite fence is a property right.
8 2
The leading case for the proposition that a spite fence statute
does not constitute a taking of property without due compensation
is Rideout v. Knox.83 This case held that the Massachusetts spite
76. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 373, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (1889). In
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1896), in discussing the Rideout
reasoning, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Apparently the principal doubt entertained by the court [in Ride-
out] was whether the maintenance of a private fence could be said
to be "injurious to the public at large," but it seems to have been
of the opinion that such a nuisance might give rise to disputes
and bickerings prejudicial to the peace and good order of the com-
munity.
Id. at 524.
77. 167 U.S. 518 (1896).
78. Id. at 524.
79. See, e.g., Saperstein v. Berman, 119 Misc. 205, 195 N.Y.S. 1 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
80. See, e.g., Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N.H. 93, 54 A. 945 (1903).
81. Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947).
82. The Cohen court cited with favor Letts v. Kessler, 50 Ohio St.
73, 42 N.E. 765 (1896), which held that to erect a spite fence is a property
right, and rejected the holding in Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d
20 (1941), which held that to erect a spite fence is not a property right.
Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 459, 50 A.2d 348, 350 (1947).
83. 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889).
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fence statute 84 was constitutional. The court first stated that the
legislature could not, under the guise of the police power, have ex-
panded the statute to any substantial structures."5 The court con-
cluded, however, that because a statute which applied to more sub-
stantial structures would be invalid, it did not follow that a spite
fence statute would also be improper:
It may be said that the difference is only one of degree.
Most differences are, when nicely analyzed. At any rate,
difference of degree is one of the distinctions by which
the right of the legislature to exercise the police power is
determined. Some small limitations of previously exist-
ing rights incident to property may be imposed for the
sake of preventing a manifest evil; large ones could not be,
except by an exercise of the right of eminent domain. 0
It was the court's conclusion that due to the insignificance 7 of the
curtailment of property rights imposed by the Massachusetts spite
fence statute, compensation was not required. The decision is
sound. If compensation were required, it is questionable what
value could be attached to the right to build a fence which is of no
benefit to the builder other than the pleasure he receives from an-
noying his neighbor.
An application of the idea that small infringements on property
rights are to be deemed a proper exercise of the police power is
found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.88 This case involved
The Kohler Act, 9 a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting coal compa-
nies from removing support under structures, even though the coal
company owned the rights to the coal. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the statute 0 but was later reversed by the United
States Supreme Court.9 1 The United States Supreme Court stated:
Government hardly could go on-if to some extent val-
ues incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every change in the general law. As long rec-
ognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-
tion and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of diminution. When
84. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 49, § 21 (1968).
85. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (1889).
86. Id.
87. "It is hard to imagine a more insignificant curtailment of the rights
of property." Id. at 373, 19 N.E. at 392.
88. 274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-671 (1966).
90. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922).
91. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the actY
2
The United States Supreme Court held in Mahon that the prohibi-
tion of mining coal under inhabited structures was too great a cur-
tailment of one's property rights to come under the police power.
Certainly when applying the so called "diminution test" to a spite
fence statute the use of the police power would be valid.93
B. Possible Objections to the Pennsylvania Statute Due to the
Peculiar Nature of the Language
1. Is the Pennsylvania statute invalid as special legislation?
The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the enactment of spe-
cial legislation. 94 In Commonwealth v. Szaluga95 the court held
that the Pennsylvania spite fence statute is an example of special
legislation." This decision, however, was limited to the criminal
aspects of the Pennsylvania spite fence statute9 The problem of
special legislation arises with the spite fence statute since it is
limited in application to "suburban districts of cities and bor-
oughs."98  Thus, the building of spite fences is prohibited only in
limited geographical areas, assuming a workable definition of "su-
burban district" can be found. The legislature, for some reason
elected to attack only part of the problem. Where you live deter-
mines your rights. The question arises as to whether such a statu-
tory scheme is valid.
Several rules have been developed by the courts to handle the
question of special legislation. The first rule is that "classification
in and of itself is not prohibited. . . ."9 This has long been the rule
in Pennsylvania. 0 0 This broad statement, however, is always
92. Id. at 413.
93. See Wolf v. Department of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 42, 220 A.2d
868, 872 (1966), for a recent application of the "diminution test" de-
scribed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
94. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32 (1968) (renumbering art. III, § 7):
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in
any case which has been or can be provided for by general law and
specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or spe-
cial law:
1. Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards,
boroughs or school districts....
7. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing....
95. 60 Pa. D. & C. 402 (C.P. Allegheny 1947).
96. Id. at 406.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15172 (1957). See notes 66-69 supra and
accompanying text.
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
99. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dillworth, 407 Pa. 129, 133, 179 A.2d
439, 442 (1962).
100. Howe v. Smith, 203 Pa. Super. 212, 199 A.2d 521 (1964):
Classification for the purpose of legislating has been recognized as
permissible under the Constitution of 1874 since Wheeler v. City
of Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875). An act which applies to all the
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qualified by the requirement that the classification be a "reason-
able" one, or conversely, that the classification not be an arbitrary
one.' 0 ' An element often mentioned in determining whether or not
a classification is "reasonable" is the "distinction" which makes the
class unique. 10 2 Often it is stated that a classification is "reason-
able" if the result of applying the statute to those persons excluded
from the statutes would be unnecessary or constitute a burden on
them.
103
Applying the various tests of reasonableness to the present
classification in the spite fence statute to those who live in subur-
ban districts of cities or boroughs, serious doubts arise as to its con-
stitutionality. It is difficult to define a distinction which requires
spite fences to be prohibited in a suburban district but allowed in
an urban district. The effect of a spite fence of cutting off light and
air would seem to be the same in either area. A spite fence statute
would appear to be equally necessary in an urban area as in a su-
burban area. Unlike the situation in Haverford Township v. Sie-
gle,10 4 it does not seem that any unnecessary burden would be
placed on those who reside in urban areas. If spite fences are to be
prohibited there seems to be no reason why they should not be pro-
hibited statewide,'0 5 particularly in light of the Pennsylvania con-
members of the class is general and not special, and thus does not
violate Article 3, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution....
Id. at 220, 199 A.2d at 524.
101. See Haverford Township v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 3-9, 28 A.2d 786,
787-790 (1942), and cases cited therein.
102. See Howe v. Smith, 203 Pa. Super. 212, 199 A.2d 521 (1964), in
which the court held that the difference in treatment offered by a physi-
cian and that offered by a chiropractor was sufficient to permit the Secre-
tary of Revenue to require a certificate of physical fitness to be signed by a
physician and refuse to accept one signed by a chiropractor. Id. at 220,
28 A.2d at 524.
103. See Haverford Township v. Siegle, 346 Pa. 1, 28 A.2d 786 (1942),
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that a statute which
provided for the appointment of a civil service commission to regulate
hiring, promotions, etc. of police in boroughs, towns, and first class
townships was not invalid as special legislation even though the statute
only applied if the police force had more than three officers. The court
held that to exclude those police forces from the statute was reasonable in
that a civil service commission for such a small force would be un-
necessary and burdensome. Id. at 9, 28 A.2d at 790. See also Durkin v.
Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 A. 237 (1895), in which the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court found that a statute regulating coal mining opera-
tions was not special legislation, even though the statute excluded mining
operations employing less than ten persons. The reasoning is similar to
that in Haverford.
104. 346 Pa. 1, 28 A.2d 786 (1942). See note 103 supra.
105. Besides the lack of reasonableness in distinguishing between those
who live in an urban as opposed to a suburban district of a city or bor-
ough, the same type of arguments arise when one attempts to explain the
stitutional provision regarding special legislation. 0 6
Although no case on point has been found, the facts in Chalmers
v. City of Philadelphia'0 7 are analogous. In this case, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court decided that a statute providing for the ex-
amination and licensing of boiler operators was unconstitutional as
special legislation.0 8 The statute only applied to first class cities
and only to a limited class of those who could be termed boiler
operators.100 Although the case can be distinguished on several
grounds" 0 the court's reasoning seems applicable to the Pennsyl-
vania spite fence statute. The court stated:
If steam engines require supervision of licensed engineers,
when operated within the limits of a city of the first class,
they are equally in need of such oversight in cities of the
second and third class, or in any other populous community
in the state. Boilers are no more dangerous or liable to ex-
plode in a city of one class than in that of another. If there
is a danger, the protection of the public is as important in a
small city or community as in a larger one. . . It is ap-
parent, however, that in this respect no substantial differ-
ence in conditions exists which affords a genuine basis for
classification along such lines.1 '
It is submitted that the restriction of spite fences in suburban
districts of cities and boroughs is analogous to the licensing of cer-
tain boiler operators in first class cities. In both cases, the evil is
the same in all areas, yet the statutes operated in limited areas.
Several cases seem to contradict the requirement of a reason-
able distinction upon which to define a class.112 The first of these
is Mauer v. Boardman. 13 The Act under attack in this case was a
part of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code 1 4 which prohibited any
exclusion of all those persons who do not live within the boundaries of a
city or borough.
106. See note 94 supra.
107. 250 Pa. 251, 95 A. 427 (1915).
108. Act of April 18, 1899, No. 50, §§ 1-14, [1899] Pa. Laws 49, as
amended, Act of March 10, 1903, No. 25, §§ 1,2, [1903] Pa. Laws 21.
109. The Act of April 18, 1899, No. 50, § 1, [1899] Pa. Laws 49 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons to have charge of
or to operate a steam boiler or steam engine over ten horse power,
in cities of the first class of this Commonwealth, except locomotive
boilers used in transportation, and steam engines and steam boilers
carrying less than fifteen pounds pressure per square inch, unless
said person or persons are upwards of twenty-one years of age and
holds a license, as hereinafter provided for....
110. Although the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits all special
legislation, it specifically prohibits special legislation regulating "labor
trade, mining, or manufacturing." See note 104 supra. The statute in the
Chalmers case regulates "labor". For this reason, it would be more sus-
ceptible to attack than the Pennsylvania spite fence statute as special leg-
islation.
111. Chalmers v. City of Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 251, 254, 95 A. 427, 428
(1915).
112. See notes 99-103 and accompanying text supra.
113. 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 598 (1939).
114. Act of June 29, 1937, No. 447, § 16, [1937] Pa. Laws 2329, as
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vehicle engaged in hauling another vehicle from having any part of
that vehicle extending over the cab of the carrier. The Act, in ef-
fect, applied only to trucks involved in hauling cars. The plaintiff
carriers contended that the statute was special legislation, that
many trucks operated on the highway with part of the load extend-
ing over the cab, and that therefore the plaintiffs were being dis-
criminated against. 115 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that the intent of the legislature had been to prevent the practice
of carrying an automobile over the cab of the carrier vehicle.116
The court felt the legislature's purpose was to promote highway
safety" 7 and to the defendant's allegation that the statute consti-
tuted special legislation replied:
That other persons in the trucking business may continue to
engage in practices, not prohibited by Section 1033 (c), but
equally and similarly dangerous, is not enough to render
the Section in question unconstitutional, because the right
of the legislature to classify with reference to the particu-
lar evil sought to be prevented is undoubted. An act de-
signed to remedy an existing ill may not be declared invalid
because it leaves other ills unremedied. It is not required
that the entire field of abuses be covered.
18
The statute was leveled at the "evil" of carrying vehicles over the
cab of the carrier vehicle. There is ample evidence, however, that
the true evil was the effect on highway safety of distributing the
load a truck carries in such a way as to raise the center of gravity
of the truck. 19 The statute created a subclass for prohibition,
whereas all members of the class constitute the same danger. It
would appear that "no substantial difference in conditions exists
which affords a genuine basis for classification along such lines.'
2 0
A recent Pennsylvania case further confuses the requirement
of a reasonable classification. In Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. V. Dil-
worth,12 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the 1959
Amendment122 to the Pennsylvania Sunday Sales Law"23 was not
unconstitutional as special legislation. The 1939 Pennsylvania Sun-
amended, Act of June 27, 1939, No. 400, § 29, [1939] Pa. Laws 1135, as
amended, PA. STAT. A.NN. tit. 75, § 1501 (1960).
115. Maurer v. Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 26, 7 A.2d 466, 473 (1939).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 25, 7 A.2d at 473.
118. Id. at 26, 7 A.2d at 473.
119. Id. at 21, 24, 7 A.2d at 471, 472.
120. Chalmers v. City of Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 251, 254, 95 A. 427, 428
(1915).
121. 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Supp. 1970).
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.4 (1963).
day Sales Act1 2 4 prohibits sales of worldly goods1 2 5 and provides
a four dollar fine for violators. 126  The 1959 Amendment lists
twenty items,127 and provides that retailers who "sell or offer
to sell" these items will be subjected to a greater penalty than that
defined by the 1939 Act.
128
The United States Supreme Court had previously decided129
that the 1959 Amendment 3 0 was not a denial of equal protection
under the law.13 '
The' Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in holding that the 1959
Amendment 3 2 did not violate the Pennsylvania prohibition against
special legislation, adopted the language of the United States Su-
preme Court which had decided that the 1959 Amendment did not
violate the United States Constitution. 13 The Pennsylvania Su-
124. Id.
125. "Whoever does or performs any worldly employment or business
whatsoever on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday (works of neces-
sity, charity and wholesome recreation excepted).... ." Id.
126. "[S]hall, upon conviction thereof in a summary proceeding, be
sentenced to pay a fine of four dollars ($4), for the use of the Common-
wealth, or in default of the payment thereof, shall suffer six (6) days' im-
prisonment." Id.
127. Whoever engages on Sunday in the business of selling, or
sells or offers for sale, on such day, at retail, clothing and wearing
apparel, clothing accessories, furniture, housewares, home busi-
ness or office furnishings, household, business or office appiiances,
hardware, tools, paints, building and lumber supply materials,
jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, musical instruments
and recordings, or toys, excluding novelties, souveniers and an-
tiques ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4699.10 (Supp. 1970).
128. [F]or the first offense, be sentenced to pay a fine of not ex-
ceeding one hundred dollars ($100), and for the second or any sub-
sequent offense committed within one year after conviction for the
first offense, be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding two
hundred dollars ($200) or undergo imprisonment not exceeding
thirty days in default thereof.
Id.
129. Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 589-592 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 540-542 (1961).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Supp. 1970).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Supp. 1970).
133. In Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dillworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439
(1962), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Two Guys [366 U.S. 582
(1961) ] decision, pointed out the bases upon which the reasonable-
ness of the 1959 Act must be upheld. "Rather it [the 1959 statute]
singles out the area where the danger has been made most evident,
and within that area treats all business enterprises equally. That in
so doing it may have drawn the line between the sale of a sofa
cover, punished by a hundred-dollar fine, and the sale of an auto-
mobile seat cover, punished by a four dollar fine, is not sufficient
void the legislation. '[A] state may classify with reference to the
evil to be prevented, and . . . if the class discriminated against is or
reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil
mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A lack of
abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one




This reasoning is equally as applicable to the question here
before us. We are satisfied that the legislative classification
bears a reasonable and logical relationship to the end
sought, that of effective enforcement of a valid legislative
act in an area particularly subject to violation.
18 4
It is particularly interesting to note Mr. Chief Justice Bell's dissent-
ing opinion.1 5 Unlike the majority he did not feel that because a
statute does not violate the federal guarantee of equal protection
under the law, it does not follow that the Pennsylvania prohibition
against special legislation has not been violated.136 It was his opin-
ion that the classification was totally arbitrary and constituted spe-
cial legislaton.
3 7
Although there are several facts which distinguish the re-
striction contained in the 1959 Amendment to the Sunday Sales
Act 18  from the restriction contained in the Pennsylvania spite fence
statute, it is still clear that the legislature was permitted to attack
part of the Sunday sales problem.
139
the specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown
to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the law that oth-
ers may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of
fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named.'
Mr. Justice Holmes in Patsone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 138, 144, 34 S. Ct. 281, 282, 58 L. Ed. 539." (366 U.S. at
541-542, 81 S. Ct. 1197).
Id. at133, 179 A.2d at 442.
134. Id. at 134, 179 A.2d at 442.
135. Id. at 135-42, 179 A.2d at 443-446 (dissenting opinion).
136. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc.v. Dillworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439
(1962). Mr. Chief Justice Bell stated:
That case [Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)] held that
the Act of 1959, supra, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Federal Constitution. Article III, Section 7, of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution is in some respects similar to, but is not the
same as, the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution,
and hence the decision in Two Guys is not controlling on this
Court's interpretation of Section 7.
Id. at 141, 179 A.2d at 446 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
137. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dillworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439
(1962). Mr. Chief Justice Bell stated:
It is clear that the attempted classification is obviously arbi-
trary and artificial, and no reasonable or proper or real or justifi-
able basis or distinction can be found between the class of goods the
sellers enumerated in the Act of 1959 and those omitted from it.
Id. at 140, 179 A.2d at 445 (dissenting opinion).
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Supp. 1970).
139. The Pennsylvania spite fence statute applies only to a limited
number of individuals within the Commonwealth. Those living outside
"suburban districts of cities or boroughs" are in no way restrained. The
1959 Amendment (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (1963), as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Supp. 1970) ), however is really a supple-
mentary prohibition of "Sunday Sales." The 1939 Act (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
It is submitted that an argument could be made that spite
fences are more common in suburban districts of cities and bor-
oughs than in urban areas, and for this reason the legislature in-
tended to curtail the prime violators.140  A major objection to this
argument is that there is no legislative history to support it. 141
2. Is the Pennsylvania spite fence statute invalid due to vague-
ness and uncertainty?142
The strongest objection to the Pennsylvania spite fence statute
arises when one attempts to define the areas in which the statute
applies. The statute is limited in operation to "any improved prem-
ises, in any suburban district of a city or borough (whether the
premises be assessed at rural, or suburban, or city rates) ....
Reference to several dictionaries14 4 does not result in an inter-
pretation of the term "suburban" district which would be helpful
in applying the statute. The court in Commonwealth v. Szaluga 14
reached the same conclusion in attempting to define the term sub-
18, § 4699.4 (1963) ) prohibits all Sunday Sales while the 1959 Act merely
increases the penalty for the sale of certain items by retailers. This dis-
tinction influenced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bargain City U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1967): "[A]nd as indicated
above, [the 1959 Amendment] does not exist as an isolated enactment but
rather one increasing penalties in a certain area of generally restricted
activity." Id. at 133, 179 A.2d at 442.
It is explained in Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), that while
the 1939 Sunday Sales Act (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.4 (1963)) had
been effective in deterring "Sunday sales" for the most part, large subur-
ban shopping centers were not deterred by the small fine (see note 126
supra). These retailers were therefore unique or distinct from the average
merchant. This fact could support legislation for this distinct class. Id.
at 591, 592.
140. Although the distinctions between the restriction of the spite fence
statute and the Sunday sales act (see note 139 supra) are valid, the lan-
guage of the United States Supreme Court in Two Guys v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582 (1961), could be applied to the Pennsylvania spite fence statute:
It was within the power of the legislature to have concluded that
these businesses were particularly disrupting the intended atmos-
phere of the day because of the great volume of motor traffic at-
tracted, the danger of their competitors also opening on Sunday
and their large number of employees. "Evils in the same field may
be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different rem-
edies.... Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind .... The legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others."
Id. at 591-592.
141. See note 51 supra.
142. The terms "unnecessary" and "malicious" are discussed in Section
II of this Comment supra.
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15171 (1957).
144. See, e.g., Wznsmn's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 846 (2d ed. 1956).
Suburb-1. An outlying part of a city; a smaller place adjacent to
a city; in pl. with the residential districts on the outskirts of a city.
2. pl. The confines; periphery; environs.
Suburb-Of, pertaining to, or characteristic of the suburbs; specif.,
U.S., blending the urban and rural.




The framers of the Pennsylvania spite fence statute in adopting
the term "suburban district" and conditioning this term by the
phrase "whether the premises be assessed at rural, suburban, or city
rates," appear to have utilized terminology which at one time was
common in Pennsylvania tax statutes.147 Although at one time
these tax statutes might have provided meaning to the Pennsyl-
vania spite fence statute, two factors defeat their present useful-
ness in this respect. First, these statutes are no longer in force.' 48
Secondly, substantial changes have occurred in the physical makeup
of our cities and boroughs which make the interpretations adopted
in the early tax statutes inapplicable to our present living condi-
tions. For example, in Simen's Appeal149 the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County construed the term "suburban district"
contained in a statute controlling tax rates15 ° to mean:
Districts occupied as residences, mainly by businessmen of
the city, not divided into small lots, but large and of un-
equal size, ornamented with lawns, trees, shrubbery, flow-
ers, etc."'
Conceding that reference to a dictionary yields only ambigu-
ous terms and that the language in Simen's Appeal"1 2 is out of date
if applied literally, is there any way to define "suburban districts"
such that the Pennsylvania spite fence statute will not fail due to
vagueness and uncertainty? One workable solution is to include
in the term suburban, all premises which are used as residences. It
could be argued that such an interpretation is justified due to the
changes in our living patterns. The court in Simen's Appeal re-
flected the living patterns common at that time in reaching a defi-
nition of "suburban districts". The change in living patterns could
warrant the suggested interpretation of suburban districts being
adopted.
CONCLUSION
It should first be noted that no Pennsylvania court has ever de-
cided the question of the constitutionality of the non-criminal as-
146. Id. at 406.
147. See, e.g., Act of March 24, 1868, No. 406, § 1, [1868] Pa. Laws 443,
repealed by Act of June 27, 1939, No. 404, § 22, [1939] Pa. Laws 1199; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5341.1-5341.21 (1968).
148. See, e.g., 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., Pa. 20-348-20-350 (1969).
149. 41 PITT. L.J. 13 (Pa. C.P. 1892).
150. Act of May 5, 1876, No. 91, § 3, [1876] Pa. Laws 124.
151. Simen's Appeal, 41 PITT. L.J. 13, 14 (Pa. C.P. 1892).
152. Id.
pects of the Pennsylvania spite fence statute.15 The question is
therefore an open one. It is submitted that if the statute was not
restricted in its operation, it would be held constitutional by the
Pennsylvania courts.' 54 It is further submitted that the restriction
of the operation of the statute should not invalidate it. First, the
definition of "suburban" should be reflective of obvious changes
in living patterns and therefore should include all residences within
a city or borough. Secondly the statute, so interpreted, should not
be invalid as special legislation. The right of the legislature to "at-
tack part of the problem"1 5 5 should be recognized in this case.
These conclusions are based in part on analogy to case law but
also on the validity of the holding in Cohen v. Perrino15 6 that spite
fences are legal. It is submitted that the policy considerations
which deny a legal right to light and air generally are not appli-
cable to the question of spite fences.
15 7
Finally, even if the statute is unconstitutional due to its restric-
tion to suburban districts of cities and boroughs, it still represents
an intent on the part of the legislature to prohibit spite fences.
Therefore, even if the statute is invalid it can still be utilized as an
argument for the reversal of the decision in Cohen.
DAVID PAULINE
153. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
154. See Sections IV A1,2 of this Comment supra.
155. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
156. 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 169 (1947).
157. See notes 21, 22 and accompanying text supra.
